Humor de espiões

Os funcionários da Agência Nacional de Segurança dos Estados Unidos resolveram partilhar o seu sentido de humor com o mundo e decidiram fazê-lo no dia dos namorados, através do Twitter. E até têm alguma piada.

“Se acabar em Guantanamo, posso viver com isso”

O The Guardian entrevistou Edward Snowden em Moscovo. Este é o resultado final desse trabalho.

Glenn Greenwald, um ano depois das primeiras revelações sobre a NSA

A 1 de Junho de 2013, Glenn Greenwald foi o primeiro jornalista a encontrar-se com Edward Snowden. Conheceram-se em Hong Kong, após meses de trocas de mensagens encriptadas. As primeiras horas foram passadas com o repórter a interrogar o antigo analista da NSA num hotel para perceber quais as motivações para aquela que seria uma das maiores fugas de informação da história. A primeira de um conjunto de notícias que lhe valeram o prémio Pulitzer foi publicada a 5 de Julho. Quase um ano depois, Greenwald está a lançar o livro “Sem Esconderijo” onde conta como tudo aconteceu e, em entrevista à PBS, recordou a importância das revelações que foram feitas.

A excelência do jornalismo mundial

Os prémios Pulitzer foram entregues ontem. Para além do grande galardão de serviço público atribuído ao The Washington Post e ao The Guardian pela série de artigos relacionados com a actividade ilegal da NSA (escritos com base nos documentos entregues por Edward Snowden), o destaque vai também para o Center For Public Integrity que venceu na categoria de jornalismo de investigação. É um marco importante para uma organização jornalística sem fins lucrativos que vive apenas de doações e crowdfunding. A lista completa dos vencedores está aqui.


Leitura para o fim-de-semana: um espião sob pressão

James Clapper é o mais alto responsável dos serviços secretos norte-americanos. Tem sob a sua tutela 16 agências de informações. E é a ele que os jornalistas ligam cada vez que estão prestes a revelar novos dados obtidos a partir dos documentos entregues por Edward Snowden. O The Daily Beast traçou o seu perfil



Spy Chief James Clapper: We Can’t Stop Another Snowden

By Jim Lo Scalzo–pool
Every morning at around 4:30 a.m., James Clapper wakes up and prepares for the worst job in Washington. He is the nation’s top intelligence officer at a time when the intelligence community is derided because it can’t keep its secrets, and loathed because some of the secrets it has tried to hide concern the same American citizens it was charged with protecting. Thanks to rogue contractor Edward Snowden, the machinations of the shadow bureaucracy Clapper heads have for the last eight months been exposed one news story at a time. Clapper is often the guy who has to call newspaper editors to tell them not to print stories that they usually publish anyway.

Clapper, 72, a 51 year veteran in the intelligence community, is also the first director of national intelligence to hold the post when the annual intelligence budgets are being slashed instead of fattened. (Between 2002 and 2010 the annual intelligence community budget doubled from around $40 billion to $80 billion.) Add to this the fact that the legal authority Clapper needs to command the 16 intelligence agencies under his control is murky at best.

And in the last eight months at least, a growing chorus in Congress and the media are calling for him to resign. Meanwhile his friends and colleagues inside the classified government see Clapper as a scapegoat whose reputation has been unfairly rubbished.

But of all the problems Clapper faces, the biggest one is still Edward Snowden, the former systems administrator for the National Security Agency who raided the U.S. government’s classified computer networks for secrets he would later turn over to journalists at the Guardian and the Washington Post. To this day the U.S. government doesn’t know the full extent of what Snowden revealed or whether more documents that have yet to be published in the press have made their way into the hands of Russian or Chinese intelligence agencies.

Snowden pilfered documents from databases designed to share intelligence more broadly within the government. Promoting this integration of secrets is the primary mission of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The office was created on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that faulted the intelligence agencies for jealously guarding information that could have prevented the attacks of that day. Clapper and his predecessors were supposed to help transform the intelligence community’s “need to know” culture to one of “need to share.” Snowden (and Chelsea Manning before him) were able to exploit the reforms promoted by the office Clapper now leads.

Covering nearly an entire wall of the waiting area outside Clapper’s office is a wooden relief sculpture dedicated to the U.S. Constitution. It contains a flag, a rendition of the constitutional assembly, and a copy of the document itself. It also has a plaque that reads, “What is the magic of the Constitution? The magic is how it states: We, the people. For the first time in history, government was about the people, not about the leader.”

And while it’s tempting to call the relief just a decoration for Clapper–especially in light of Snowden’s disclosures of wholesale surveillance on virtually the entire planet–that wouldn’t be entirely fair. However belatedly and reluctantly, he has moved in the last eight months to push the intelligence community to acknowledge many of the activities it has kept from the public since 9/11. Since the Snowden disclosures (and a court order last summer in favor of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by civil liberties groups about domestic surveillance), Clapper has declassified scores of documents related to some of the most sensitive programs he would have once done everything to keep secret. Thedeclassified documents included not only the court warrants to collect the troves of call records, but also a secret court’s findings that the government inadvertently collected tens of thousands of domestic Internet communications that had nothing to do with foreign intelligence targets.

Clapper said that in retrospect it would have been better for the government to acknowledge the collection of call records when the program started after 9/11. Even long-time critics applaud him for that.

“I think he deserves credit for rethinking the calculation over secrecy,” said Steve Aftergood, the director of the Federation of American Scientists’ Project on Government Secrecy. “I think post-Snowden, he quickly realized that declassification and disclosure would serve the interests of the intelligence community.”

Clapper also acknowledges that the very human nature of the bureaucracy he controls virtually insures that more mass disclosures are inevitable. “In the end,” he says, “we will never ever be able to guarantee that there will not be an Edward Snowden or another Chelsea Manning because this is a large enterprise composed of human beings with all their idiosyncrasies.”

Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, concurs: “I do think he recognizes that we are in a new normal after Snowden where we can’t operate with the expectation where nothing will get out,” he said. “If you are going to be dealing with the world where there are these disclosures you have to be more transparent to make the case to the public what you are doing and not doing.”

O artigo completo está aqui. 

A luta contra a vigilância da NSA

Leitura para o fim-de-semana: como a NSA detecta os alvos dos drones

É a primeira história da revista digital The Intercept, dirigida por Glenn Greenwald. E logo em grande: a publicação revela o papel secreto da NSA na identificação dos alvos do programa de assassinatos da administração norte-americana, levado a cabo por drones. Para além dos documentos fornecidos por Edward Snowden, o artigo é escrito com base nas declarações de dois pilotos destes aviões não tripulados.

Foto: Kirsty Wigglesworth/Associated Press.

Foto: Kirsty Wigglesworth/Associated Press.

The NSA’s Secret Role in the U.S. Assassination Program

The National Security Agency is using complex analysis of electronic surveillance, rather than human intelligence, as the primary method to locate targets for lethal drone strikes – an unreliable tactic that results in the deaths of innocent or unidentified people.

According to a former drone operator for the military’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) who also worked with the NSA, the agency often identifies targets based on controversial metadata analysis and cell-phone tracking technologies. Rather than confirming a target’s identity with operatives or informants on the ground, the CIA or the U.S. military then orders a strike based on the activity and location of the mobile phone a person is believed to be using.

The drone operator, who agreed to discuss the top-secret programs on the condition of anonymity, was a member of JSOC’s High Value Targeting task force, which is charged with identifying, capturing or killing terrorist suspects in Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

His account is bolstered by top-secret NSA documents previously provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden. It is also supported by a former drone sensor operator with the U.S. Air Force, Brandon Bryant, who has become an outspoken critic of the lethal operations in which he was directly involved in Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen.

In one tactic, the NSA “geolocates” the SIM card or handset of a suspected terrorist’s mobile phone, enabling the CIA and U.S. military to conduct night raids and drone strikes to kill or capture the individual in possession of the device.

The former JSOC drone operator is adamant that the technology has been responsible for taking out terrorists and networks of people facilitating improvised explosive device attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. But he also states that innocent people have “absolutely” been killed as a result of the NSA’s increasing reliance on the surveillance tactic.

One problem, he explains, is that targets are increasingly aware of the NSA’s reliance on geolocating, and have moved to thwart the tactic. Some have as many as 16 different SIM cards associated with their identity within the High Value Target system. Others, unaware that their mobile phone is being targeted, lend their phone, with the SIM card in it, to friends, children, spouses and family members.

Some top Taliban leaders, knowing of the NSA’s targeting method, have purposely and randomly distributed SIM cards among their units in order to elude their trackers. “They would do things like go to meetings, take all their SIM cards out, put them in a bag, mix them up, and everybody gets a different SIM card when they leave,” the former drone operator says. “That’s how they confuse us.”

As a result, even when the agency correctly identifies and targets a SIM card belonging to a terror suspect, the phone may actually be carried by someone else, who is then killed in a strike. According to the former drone operator, the geolocation cells at the NSA that run the tracking program – known as Geo Cell –sometimes facilitate strikes without knowing whether the individual in possession of a tracked cell phone or SIM card is in fact the intended target of the strike.

“Once the bomb lands or a night raid happens, you know that phone is there,” he says. “But we don’t know who’s behind it, who’s holding it. It’s of course assumed that the phone belongs to a human being who is nefarious and considered an ‘unlawful enemy combatant.’ This is where it gets very shady.”

The former drone operator also says that he personally participated in drone strikes where the identity of the target was known, but other unknown people nearby were also killed.

“They might have been terrorists,” he says. “Or they could have been family members who have nothing to do with the target’s activities.”

What’s more, he adds, the NSA often locates drone targets by analyzing the activity of a SIM card, rather than the actual content of the calls. Based on his experience, he has come to believe that the drone program amounts to little more than death by unreliable metadata.

“People get hung up that there’s a targeted list of people,” he says. “It’s really like we’re targeting a cell phone. We’re not going after people – we’re going after their phones, in the hopes that the person on the other end of that missile is the bad guy.”

The Obama administration has repeatedly insisted that its operations kill terrorists with the utmost precision.

In his speech at the National Defense University last May, President Obama declared that “before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured – the highest standard we can set.” He added that, “by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life.”

But the increased reliance on phone tracking and other fallible surveillance tactics suggests that the opposite is true. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which uses a conservative methodology to track drone strikes, estimates that at least 273 civilians in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia have been killed by unmanned aerial assaults under the Obama administration. A recent study conducted by a U.S. military adviser found that, during a single year in Afghanistan – where the majority of drone strikes have taken place – unmanned vehicles were 10 times more likely than conventional aircraft to cause civilian casualties.

The NSA declined to respond to questions for this article. Caitlin Hayden, a spokesperson for the National Security Council, also refused to discuss “the type of operational detail that, in our view, should not be published.”

In describing the administration’s policy on targeted killings, Hayden would not say whether strikes are ever ordered without the use of human intelligence. She emphasized that “our assessments are not based on a single piece of information. We gather and scrutinize information from a variety of sources and methods before we draw conclusions.”

Hayden felt free, however, to note the role that human intelligence plays after a deadly strike occurs. “After any use of targeted lethal force, when there are indications that civilian deaths may have occurred, intelligence analysts draw on a large body of information – including human intelligence, signals intelligence, media reports, and surveillance footage – to help us make informed determinations about whether civilians were in fact killed or injured.”

The government does not appear to apply the same standard of care in selecting whom to target for assassination. The former JSOC drone operator estimates that the overwhelming majority of high-value target operations he worked on in Afghanistan relied on signals intelligence, known as SIGINT, based on the NSA’s phone-tracking technology.

“Everything they turned into a kinetic strike or a night raid was almost 90 percent that,” he says. “You could tell, because you’d go back to the mission reports and it will say ‘this mission was triggered by SIGINT,’ which means it was triggered by a geolocation cell.”

In July, the Washington Post relied exclusively on former senior U.S. intelligence officials and anonymous sources to herald the NSA’s claims about its effectiveness at geolocating terror suspects.

Within the NSA, the paper reported, “A motto quickly caught on at Geo Cell: ‘We Track ’Em, You Whack ’Em.’”

But the Post article included virtually no skepticism about the NSA’s claims, and no discussion at all about how the unreliability of the agency’s targeting methods results in the killing of innocents.

In fact, as the former JSOC drone operator recounts, tracking people by metadata and then killing them by SIM card is inherently flawed. The NSA “will develop a pattern,” he says, “where they understand that this is what this person’s voice sounds like, this is who his friends are, this is who his commander is, this is who his subordinates are. And they put them into a matrix. But it’s not always correct. There’s a lot of human error in that.”

The JSOC operator’s account is supported by another insider who was directly involved in the drone program. Brandon Bryant spent six years as a “stick monkey” – a drone sensor operator who controls the “eyes” of the U.S. military’s unmanned aerial vehicles. By the time he left the Air Force in 2011, Bryant’s squadron, which included a small crew of veteran drone operators, had been credited with killing 1,626 “enemies” in action.

Bryant says he has come forward because he is tormented by the loss of civilian life he believes that he and his squadron may have caused. Today he is committed to informing the public about lethal flaws in the U.S. drone program.

Bryant describes the program as highly compartmentalized: Drone operators taking shots at targets on the ground have little idea where the intelligence is coming from.

“I don’t know who we worked with,” Bryant says. “We were never privy to that sort of information. If the NSA did work with us, like, I have no clue.”

During the course of his career, Bryant says, many targets of U.S. drone strikes evolved their tactics, particularly in the handling of cell phones. “They’ve gotten really smart now and they don’t make the same mistakes as they used to,” he says. “They’d get rid of the SIM card and they’d get a new phone, or they’d put the SIM card in the new phone.”

O artigo completo está aqui.

The Intercept: a primeira revista digital de Glenn Greenwald

No final de Janeiro escrevi aqui sobre o que estava a ser feito pela First Look Media, uma organização jornalística criada pelo multimilionário fundador do eBay, Pierre Omidyar, sob a liderança de Glenn Greenwald. Agora, foi lançada a primeira de “inúmeras revistas digitais” que serão publicadas pelo grupo. Chama-se The Intercept e tem, nas palavras dos fundadores dois objectivos. O primeiro, de curto prazo, é ser “uma plataforma e uma estrutura editorial” para divulgar as informações fornecidas por Edward Snowden. O segundo, a longo prazo, é cobrir um vasto conjunto de assuntos que vão dos abusos da justiça civil e criminal a todas as formas de corrupção. 

A The Intercept nasce com duas histórias online: uma, assinada por Greenwald e Jeremy Scahill, sobre como as informações electrónicas recolhidas pela NSA são utilizadas no programa de assassinatos através de drones. Ou seja, os mísseis dos aviões norte-americanos têm como alvos telemóveis que se suspeitam estarem nas mãos de alegados terroristas – o que aumenta em muito o risco de vítimas civis inocentes.

A segunda é um projecto do fotógrafo Trevor Paglen, que publica imagens aéreas de três dos mais secretos edifícios dos Estados Unidos: a sedes da NSA, do National Reconnaissance Office e do National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Trevor Paglen

Trevor Paglen

A transformação da antiga “Montanha do Diabo”

Foi o ponto mais avançado da espionagem da NSA durante a Guerra Fria. Localizada nos arredores de Berlim, dentro das fronteiras do Pacto de Varsóvia, a “Montanha do Diabo” era usada para ouvir as comunicações soviéticas em todas as direcções. Agora, está abandonada. E foi transformada num paraíso de…graffitis. A história é do The New York Times.

Glenn Greenwald na primeira pessoa

Em 2013, Glenn Greenwald publicou a história do ano: o escândalo de espionagem da NSA. Elaboradas com base nos documentos desviados por Edward Snowden, as sucessivas notícias revelaram práticas ilegais por parte da agência de espionagem norte-americana. Por causa delas, o companheiro de Greenwald foi preso durante várias horas num aeroporto britânico. A Vice viajou até ao Rio de Janeiro – onde ele vive – para o entrevistar e saber mais sobre este advogado transformado em jornalista paladino das liberdades individuais.

O mais importante assalto de que nunca ouvimos falar

A 8 de Março de 1971, um pequeno escritório do FBI em Filadélfia foi assaltado. Os ladrões levaram apenas documentos. No entanto, esses papéis provavam que o director do FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, tinha ordenado inúmeras acções de vigilância e espionagem sobre os grupos de activistas que lutavam pelos direitos civis e pelo fim da guerra do Vietname. Aos poucos, a documentação começou a chegar a alguns jornais – que publicaram a história. Os autores do roubo nunca foram conhecidos: até agora. Uma das primeiras jornalistas a abordar o assunto, no The Washington Post, Betty Medsger, escreveu um livro sobre a história. Mais: conseguiu convencer alguns dos protagonistas a assumir a autoria do assalto. Na época em que as revelações dos documentos de Edward Snowden ainda estão a causar impacto e a provocar mudanças, conhecer a postura do governo norte-americano ao longo dos anos dá uma outra perspectiva às coisas. Uma história incrível, para ler aqui.  

Leitura para o fim-de-semana: como a NSA quase acabou com a internet como a conhecemos

Nos últimos seis meses, os jornais The Guardian e The Washington Post, bem como a revista Der Spiegel, com base nos documentos revelados por Edward Snowden têm divulgado os vários programas da NSA para aceder a dados supostamente privados dos internautas. Neste artigo da Wired, Steven Levy, explica as consequências que estas revelações tiveram na industria e como elas podem levar a algo há muito temido: a balcanização da internet, que seria o seu fim.

@Christoph Niemann

@Christoph Niemann

How the NSA Almost Killed the Internet

  • 01.07.14
Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and the other tech titans have had to fight for their lives against their own government. An exclusive look inside their year from hell—and why the Internet will never be the same.

On June 6, 2013, Washington Post reporters called the communications depart­ments of Apple, Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and other Internet companies. The day before, a report in the British newspaper The Guardianhad shocked Americans with evidence that the telecommunications giant Verizon had voluntarily handed a database of every call made on its network to the National Security Agency. The piece was by reporter Glenn Greenwald, and the information came from Edward Snowden, a 29-year-old IT consultant who had left the US with hundreds of thousands of documents detailing the NSA’s secret procedures.

Greenwald was the first but not the only journalist that Snowden reached out to. The Post’s Barton Gellman had also connected with him. Now, collaborating with documentary filmmaker and Snowden confidante Laura Poitras, he was going to extend the story to Silicon Valley. Gellman wanted to be the first to expose a top-secret NSA program called Prism. Snowden’s files indicated that some of the biggest companies on the web had granted the NSA and FBI direct access to their servers, giving the agencies the ability to grab a person’s audio, video, photos, emails, and documents. The government urged Gellman not to identify the firms involved, but Gellman thought it was important. “Naming those companies is what would make it real to Americans,” he says. Now a team of Post reporters was reaching out to those companies for comment.

It would be the start of a chain reaction that threatened the foundations of the industry. The subject would dominate headlines for months and become the prime topic of conversation in tech circles. For years, the tech companies’ key policy issue had been negotiating the delicate balance between maintaining customers’ privacy and providing them benefits based on their personal data. It was new and contro­versial territory, sometimes eclipsing the substance of current law, but over time the companies had achieved a rough equilibrium that allowed them to push forward. The instant those phone calls from reporters came in, that balance was destabilized, as the tech world found itself ensnared in a fight far bigger than the ones involving oversharing on Facebook or ads on Gmail. Over the coming months, they would find themselves at war with their own government, in a fight for the very future of the Internet.

It wasn’t just revenue at stake. So were the very ideals that had sustained the TECH WORLD since the birth of the INTERNET.

But first they had to figure out what to tell the Post. “We had 90 minutes to respond,” says Facebook’s head of security, Joe Sullivan. No one at the company had ever heard of a program called Prism. And the most damning implication—that Facebook and the other companies granted the NSA direct access to their servers in order to suck up vast quantities of information—seemed outright wrong. CEO Mark Zuckerberg was taken aback by the charge and asked his exec­utives whether it was true. Their answer: no.

Similar panicked conversations were taking place at Google, Apple, and Microsoft. “We asked around: Are there any surreptitious ways of getting information?” says Kent Walker, Google’s general counsel. “No.”

Nevertheless, the Post published its report that day describing the Prism program. (The Guardian ran a similar story about an hour later.) The piece included several images leaked from a 41-slide NSA PowerPoint, including one that listed the tech companies that participated in the program and the dates they ostensibly began fully cooperating. Microsoft came first, in September 2007, followed the next year by Yahoo. Google and Facebook were added in 2009. Most recent was Apple, in October 2012. The slide used each company’s corporate logo. It was like a sales force boasting a series of trophy contracts. Just a day earlier, the public had learned that Verizon and probably other telephone companies had turned over all their call records to the government. Now, it seemed, the same thing was happen­ing with email, search history, even Instagram pictures.

The tech companies quickly issued denials that they had granted the US govern­ment direct access to their customers’ data. But that stance was complicated by the fact that they did participate—often unwillingly—in a government program that required them to share data when a secret court ordered them to do so. Google and its counterparts couldn’t talk about all the details, in part because they were legally barred from full disclosure and in part because they didn’t know all the details about how the program actually worked. And so their responses were seen less as full-throated denials than mealy-mouthed contrivances.

They hardly had the time to figure out how to frame their responses to Gellman’s account before President Obama weighed in. While implicitly confirming the program (and condemning the leak), he said, “With respect to the Internet and emails, this does not apply to US citizens and does not apply to people living in the United States.” This may have soothed some members of the public, but it was no help to the tech industry. The majority of Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, and Yahoo customers are not citizens of the US. Now those customers, as well as foreign regulatory agencies like those in the European Union, were being led to believe that using US-based services meant giving their data directly to the NSA.

“Every time we spoke it seemed to make matters worse,” one tech executive says. “We just were not believed.”

The hard-earned trust that the tech giants had spent years building was in danger of evaporating—and they seemed powerless to do anything about it. Legally gagged, they weren’t free to provide the full context of their cooperation or resistance. Even the most emphatic denial—a blog post by Google CEO Larry Page and chief legal officer David Drummond headlined, “What the …”—did not quell suspicions. How could it, when an NSA slide indicated that anyone’s personal information was just one click away? When Drummond took questions on the Guardian website later in the month, his interlocutors were hostile:

“Isn’t this whole show not just a face-saving exercise … after you have been found to be in cahoots with the NSA?”

“How can we tell if Google is lying to us?”

“We lost a decade-long trust in you, Google.”

“I will cease using Google mail.”

The others under siege took note. “Every time we spoke it seemed to make matters worse,” an executive at one company says. “We just were not believed.”

“The fact is, the government can’t put the genie back in the bottle,” says Face­book’s global communications head, Michael Buckley. “We can put out any statement or statistics, but in the wake of what feels like weekly disclosures of other government activity, the question is, will anyone believe us?”

At an appearance at a tech conference last September, Facebook’s Zuckerberg expressed his disgust. “The government blew it,” he said. But the consequences of the government’s actions—and the spectacular leak that informed the world about it—was now plopped into the problem set of Zuckerberg, Page, Tim Cook, Marissa Mayer, Steve Ballmer, and anyone else who worked for or invested in a company that held customer data on its servers.

Not just revenue was at stake. So were ideals that have sustained the tech world since the Internet exploded from a Department of Defense project into an interconnected global web that spurred promises of a new era of comity. The Snowden leaks called into question the Internet’s role as a symbol of free speech and empowerment. If the net were seen as a means of widespread surveillance, the resulting paranoia might affect the way people used it. Nations outraged at US intelligence-gathering practices used the disclosures to justify a push to require data generated in their countries to remain there, where it could not easily be hoovered by American spies. Implementing such a scheme could balkanize the web, destroying its open essence and dramatically raising the cost of doing business.

Silicon Valley was reeling, collateral damage in the war on terror. And it was only going to get worse.”

O artigo completo está aqui

O caso de Edward Snowden

Explicar assuntos complexos de uma forma simples é uma arte. Mas quando é bem conseguido, como é o caso desta infografia animada sobre Edward Snowden, nem damos pelo tempo passar.

A conselheira de Barack Obama

Susan Rice é a conselheira de Segurança Nacional de Barack Obama. Antes, foi embaixadora dos Estados Unidos na ONU. E esteve para suceder a Hillary Clinton, no cargo de Secretária de Estado. Agora é ela quem acorda o presidente norte-americano se há uma crise internacional. Em entrevista a Lesley Stahl, do 60 Minutes, fala sobre as crises no Irão, Síria e o escândalo de espionagem da NSA – sobre o qual diz que Edward Snowden não merece uma amnistia: merece um julgamento.

A mensagem de Natal alternativa de 2013

A mensagem de Natal alternativa do Channel 4 News é já uma tradição: feita desde 1993 já foi protagonizada pelo ex-presidente iraniano, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Marge Simpson, Brigite Bardot ou Jesse Jackson. Este ano o escolhido foi o antigo analista da NSA, Edward Snowden.

Espionagem informática: a versão da NSA (parte dois)

Na segunda parte desta reportagem sobre a National Security Agency, os jornalistas do 60 Minutes visitam o centro de operações da agência, mostram a chamada black chamber – o local onde trabalham os melhores analistas – e entrevistam alguns dos jovens saídos do liceu que passam dias a tentar decifrar códigos. E revelam que a NSA gastou milhões de dólares a identificar todos os aparelhos a que Edward Snowden teve acesso e a removê-los para garantir que ele não tinha deixado para trás nenhum vírus ou escuta

Espionagem informática: a versão da NSA

Entre a comunidade de informações dos Estados Unidos a National Security Agency (NSA) é também conhecida por outro nome: Never Say Anything (nunca dizer nada). No entanto, perante as sucessivas revelações feitas pela imprensa a partir dos documentos cedidos por Edward Snowden, a agência decidiu mudar a sua política de silêncio e deu ao programa 60 Minutes acesso às suas instalações. O jornalista John Miller – que começa por dizer que já trabalhou num gabonete governamental na área das informações – pôde falar com funcionários e analistas que explicam até como os metadados dos telemóveis são usados para identificar potenciais terroristas. Na primeira parte deste programa os responsáveis da NSA defendem os seus programas de espionagem, garantem que cumprem escrupulosamente a lei e revelam que Edward Snowden tem em mãos um milhão e meio de documentos confidenciais – incluíndo 31 mil sobre o Irão e a China que lhes permitiria proteger-se da espionagem norte-americana.

As revelações de Edward Snowden em números

Como a NSA controla os telemóveis dos potenciais alvos

Depois dos emails e pesquisas na internet era apenas uma questão de tempo até alguém noticiar que National Security Agency controla milhões de dados diários sobre o uso de telemóveis para localizar possíveis alvos. Os programas da agência servem também para localizar os possíveis acompanhantes desses suspeitos que, por sua vez, se podem passar a tornar, eles próprios, alvos. A notícia é do The Washington Post, mais uma vez com base na documentação fornecida por Edward Snowden.

Esta é a explicação em vídeo de como tudo funciona.

E este o desenho infográfico


A carta aberta de Carl Bernstein ao editor do The Guardian

“You are being called to testify at a moment when governments in Washington and London seem intent on erecting the most serious (and self-serving) barriers against legitimate news reporting – especially of excessive government secrecy – we have seen in decades.

The stories published by The Guardian, the Washington Post and the New York Times based on Mr Snowden’s information to date hardly seem to represent reckless disclosure of specific national security secrets of value to terrorists or enemy governments or in such a manner as to make possible the identification of undercover agents or operatives whose lives or livelihoods would be endangered by such disclosure. Such information has been carefully redacted by the Guardian and other publications and withheld from stories based on information from Mr Snowden. Certainly terrorists are already aware that they are under extensive surveillance, and did not need Mr Snowden or the Guardian to tell them that.

Rather, the stories published by the Guardian – like those in the Washington Post and the New York Times – describe the scale and scope of electronic information-gathering our governments have been engaged in – most of it hardly surprising in the aggregate, given the state of today’s technology, and a good deal of it previously known and reported and indeed often discussed “on background” with reporters by high government officials from the White House to Downing Street confident that their identities will not be disclosed.”

O texto completo, aqui.

Foto: Teri Pengilley

Foto: Teri Pengilley